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Abstract
Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent
aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition.
We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is
not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous
choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto
condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utili-
tarian aggregation: both society’s utility function and its probability
measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.
1 Introduction
Harsanyi (1955) oﬀered an axiomatic justiﬁcation of utilitarianism. He has
assumed that all individuals in society as well as society itself are von-
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility maximizers (von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944)). In this model, one Pareto indiﬀerence condition
implies that the utility function of society is a convex combination of the
utility functions of individuals in society.
The vNM framework deals with a single individual facing lotteries over
outcomes. The use of this framework in Harsanyi’s social choice model pre-
supposes that all individuals face the same lotteries, that is, they agree on the
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1probabilities of any given lottery. Thus individuals diﬀer only in their pref-
erences but not in their beliefs. This, however, is rather restrictive. While
divergence of opinions is sometimes the result of diﬀerent values assigned
by diﬀerent individuals to outcomes, much of it is due to diﬀerences of be-
liefs (i.e., diﬀerent probability distributions over states of nature). Everyone
wants peace and prosperity, but people have very diﬀerent views about the
way to achieve these common goals.
In Savage’s (1954) model there is a separation between preferences rep-
resented by a cardinal (i.e., vNM) utility and information represented by a
(subjective) probability. This model permits the examination of Harsanyi’s
utilitarian aggregation in the more general case where individuals have dif-
ferent beliefs. Indeed, more recent works have studied utilitarian aggregation
in Savage-like models, aggregating individuals’ utilities into society’s utility
and individuals’ probabilities into society’s probability. Several authors have
found that such an aggregation, generalizing Harsanyi’s theorem, is impos-
sible when Pareto and nondictatorial conditions are imposed (Hylland and
Zeckhauser (1979), Mongin (1995)). Moreover, impossibility results have also
been recently obtained for more general classes of preferences (Mongin (1998)
and Blackorby et al. (2000)).
These impossibility results are troubling. If there is, indeed, no way to ag-
gregate preferences of all individuals, then a ruling party or a president may
feel exempted from seeking to represent society in its entirety even if elected
by an incidental majority. This seems to contradict our moral intuition on
this issue, which demands that a majority should not disregard opinions and
desires of minorities. Moreover, ignoring minorities may lead to instability
and ineﬃciency in a society where governments shift frequently between op-
posing parties. In this note we argue, however, that the impossibility results
are derived from a counter-intuitive axiom. Further, an appropriate weak-
ening of this axiom leads to a possibility result. Thus, we conclude that the
impossibility result cannot be cited as an indirect justiﬁcation of ignoring
2minority views.
The Pareto condition that drives the impossibility of aggregation requires
that if all individuals in society agree on preferences between two alternatives,
so should society. Despite its apparently innocent formulation, we do not ﬁnd
this condition very plausible in a model incorporating subjective beliefs, as
the following example shows.
Two gentlemen agree to ﬁght a duel at dawn, although either can back
down. The result of a duel is that one wins and the other loses (fatally). The
gentlemen have opposite rankings of the three consequences: (1 wins and 2
loses), (no duel), and (2 wins and 1 loses). Assume, for example, that the
cardinal rankings of these consequences are (1;0;5) for the ﬁrst gentleman
and (5;0;1) for the second. The fact that both prefer duel to no duel, in
spite of their opposite taste for the consequences, is possible only because
they hold contradictory beliefs. Each of them believes, with a probability of
more than 90%, that he will win the duel. The combination of very diﬀerent
utility functions and very diﬀerent subjective probabilities yields the same
preferences. If they had similar beliefs, a duel would not take place.
A straightforward adaptation of Pareto’s condition implies that society
should rank duel above no duel, as both prefer it. Indeed, so do the Pareto
axioms used to obtain impossibility results. But we claim that the Pareto
condition cannot serve as an argument for society to prefer that a duel take
place.
Observe that we do not argue that a duel should not take place. A liberal
approach might suggest that society should have no preferences at all over
issues such as the duel. Moreover, even if one takes a more paternalistic ap-
proach, according to which society does have a complete preference relation,
society might favor a duel for a variety of reasons. We only argue that the
Pareto condition cannot be one of them.
Consider, ﬁrst, the following example. Mary has to choose between two
cups containing hot drinks. She believes that the ﬁrst contains coﬀee and
3the second – tea, and, given her strong preference for coﬀee, she prefers the
ﬁrst cup. No other individual is aﬀected by this choice. Hence all other
individuals are indiﬀerent between Mary’s two choices. But everyone else is
convinced that Mary is in fact wrong, and that the contents of the cups are
reversed. Society may refrain from expressing preferences over Mary’s two
choices. But if society does have such preferences, we ﬁnd that basing them
on a formal application of the Pareto condition is unjustiﬁed.
By a similar token, the duel is preferred by both gentlemen only because
they diﬀer in their beliefs. Society cannot, perhaps, judge who is more ac-
curate in his probability assessments. But it is evident that at least one of
them is wrong: every probability assessment would induce at least one of the
gentlemen to back down. In this situation, we argue, the Pareto condition
cannot serve as a reason for society to prefer that a duel take place.
Our duel example is similar to an example in Raiﬀa (1968), suggesting the
rejection of the Pareto condition in the face of contradictory beliefs. Raiﬀa
deals with aggregation of the opinions of diﬀerent experts. These experts
are consulted about both the desirability of outcomes and the plausibility
of scenarios. Thus, each expert provides a utility function and a probability
measure. Raiﬀa notes that it might well be the case that all experts will prefer
alternative a over b, while b will be preferred to a if one adopts the average
utility function and the average probability measure. Thus, Raiﬀa (1968)
argues against the Pareto condition whenever it contradicst expected utility
maximization with respect to average utility and average probability. By
contrast, we argue that the Pareto condition is unpalatable without reference
to a particular method of aggregation. 1 Moreover, whereas Raiﬀa deals with
a single decision maker, who is unsure about the measurement of utility and of
probability, our focus is on social welfare, where conﬂict of interest is inherent.
Thus, in Raiﬀa’s problem one may be “wrong” both about probabilities and
1Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1987) argue against welfare comparisons in a general
equilibrium model with diﬀerential information but without common prior.
4about utilities, whereas in the social welfare set-up only probabilities admit
a notion of correctness.
In this note we suggest a weaker Pareto condition, which is more plausible
in a model that separates tastes and beliefs. With this condition a nondicta-
torial separate aggregation of tastes and of beliefs, a la Harsanyi, is possible.
Our Pareto condition is restricted to alternatives in which individuals may
diﬀer only in their tastes and not in their beliefs. More speciﬁcally, an al-
ternative is said to be a lottery if all individuals agree on the distribution of
outcomes induced by this alternative. We require that if all individuals are
indiﬀerent between two alternatives, which are lotteries in our sense, then
society too is indiﬀerent between them. Note that if such an alternative has
ﬁnitely many consequences, it corresponds to a classical vNM lottery. Thus,
by Harsanyi’s theorem, our Pareto condition implies that society’s utility
function is a linear combination of the utility functions of the individuals.
More surprisingly, this condition also implies that the probability measure of
society is an aﬃne combination of those of the individuals. Conversely, our
Pareto condition is satisﬁed whenever society’s utility is a linear combina-
tion of the individuals’ utilities and society’s probability measure is an aﬃne
combination of those of the individuals.
In conclusion, we argue that the impossibility theorems result from a
Pareto condition that is far from compelling. It is based on the requirement
that society approves unanimous preferences of individuals, even when una-
nimity is the result of conﬂicting tastes and conﬂicting beliefs. Our Pareto
condition restricts social approval of unanimity only to those cases where all
individuals have identical beliefs. This seems to be the natural extension of
Harsanyi’s utilitarianism for the expected utility model to that of subjective
expected utility.
The next section presents the main result, while Section 3 contains the
proof.
52 The Main Result
Let (S;Σ) be a -measurable space, where S is a set of states (of nature),
and Σ is a -algebra of events. Denote by X a set of outcomes endowed
with a -algebra. The set A = fa j a:S ! X; a is Σ  measurableg is
the set of alternatives (or acts in Savage’s terminology). Society is a set of
individuals N = f1;:::;ng. Individual i 2 N has preferences %i A  A,
whereas society’s preferences are denoted %0 A  A. For 0  i  n, the
relations i and i are deﬁned as the symmetric and asymmetric parts of
%i, as usual. We assume that each of preference relations is represented by
expected utility maximization, that is, for 0  i  n there are a measurable
and bounded utility function ui : X ! R and a probability measure i on Σ





assume that, for each 0  i  n, i is countably additive and non-atomic,
and that ui is not constant.2
Let Λ = fE 2 Σjfor all 1  i;j  n, i(E) = j(E)g. Thus, an event E
is in Λ when all individuals agree on its probability.
An alternative a is a lottery if for each measurable subset of outcome, Y ,
a1(Y ) 2 Λ. Thus, in a lottery all individuals agree on the probability of
the events that are involved in the deﬁnition of the lottery. Note the formal
diﬀerence between lotteries as deﬁned here and vNM lotteries over X. The
latter are probability distributions over X (with ﬁnite support) while the ﬁrst
are measurable functions. Nevertheless, it is easy to show that ﬁnitely-valued
lotteries, as deﬁned here, can be identiﬁed with vNM lotteries over X. This
is done in Claim 4 in the proof of the Theorem.
The restricted Pareto condition: For all lotteries a and b, if for every
i 2 N, a i b, then a 0 b.
2Conditions on preferences guaranteeing representation by a subjective countably ad-
ditive probability measure and a bounded utility function are well known. See Savage
(1954) and Villegas (1964), or Arrow (1965).
6Theorem The Restricted Pareto Condition holds iﬀ 0 is an aﬃne combi-
nation of fign
i=1 and u0 is a linear combination of fuign
i=1.
This theorem does not restrict the coeﬃcients used in the aﬃne and lin-
ear combinations that deﬁne beliefs and tastes of society. One may wish to
augment our condition to obtain results according to which 0 and u0 are
convex combinations of fign
i=1 and of fuign
i=1, respectively, with strictly pos-
itive coeﬃcients, and perhaps also with equal coeﬃcients, at least in the case
of beliefs (where interpersonal comparisons are natural). Such derivations
are beyond the scope of this note.
3 Proof of the Theorem
The restricted Pareto condition is suﬃcient. Assume that this con-
dition holds. We prove, ﬁrst, that the condition implies that 0 is an aﬃne
combination of fign
i=1. Next, we show that this implies also that u0 is a
linear combination of fuign
i=1.
Denote  = (i)n
i=1 and ˆ  = (i)n
i=0. Let Z and ˆ Z be the ranges of the
vector measures  and ˆ  correspondingly. Note, that Z is the projection of
ˆ Z, and for any ˆ z 2 ˆ Z, ˆ (S)  ˆ z 2 ˆ Z. Due to the Lyapunov Theorem, both
Z and ˆ Z are convex.
Claim 1: If (z0; 1
2(S)) 2 ˆ Z, then z0 = 1
2.
Proof: Assume the contrary. Then, without loss of generality, for some event
E, 0(E) > 1
2 while (E) = 1
2(S). Choose x;y 2 X with u0(x) > u0(y).
Consider alternatives a;b such that a is x on E and y on Ec, while b is y on
E, and x on Ec. Then a i b for each i 2 N but a 0 b, contrary to our
assumption.
Proposition 3 in Mongin (1995) states that, under the conclusion of Claim
1, 0 is an aﬃne combination of fign
i=1. The following two claims constitute
a shorter proof of this fact, and are given here for the sake of completeness.
7Claim 2: For every z 2 Z there exists a unique z0 = z0(z) such that
(z0;z) 2 ˆ Z.
Proof: Assume that ˆ z = (z0;z) and ˆ w = (w0;z) are in ˆ Z, with z0 < w0.
Since ˆ (S) ˆ w 2 ˆ Z, it follows from the convexity of ˆ Z that 1
2ˆ z+ 1




2(S)) 2 ˆ Z. This contradicts Claim 1, as the ﬁrst coordinate
of this point is less than 1
2.
Claim 3: For every z;w 2 Z and every 0    1, z0(z + (1  )w) =
z0(z) + (1  )z0(w).
Proof: Let ˆ z = (z0(z);z) and ˆ w = (z0(w);w). By the convexity of Z,
ˆ z+(1)ˆ w 2 ˆ Z. The ﬁrst coordinate of this point is z0(z)+(1)z0(w).
The last n coordinates are z+(1)w, and thus the result follows by Claim
2.
By Claim 3, z0(z) is an aﬃne function on Z, that is, there are (i)i2N 2 RN
such that z0(z) =
P
i2N izi. Hence, for each event E, 0(E) =
P
i2N ii(E).
Substituting S for E in the last equality we conclude that
P
i2N i = 1.
Now we show that u0 is a linear combination of fuign
i=1. We ﬁrst recall a
well-known conclusion of the Lyapunov Theorem (proved by induction).
Claim 4: Assume that p1;:::pm are non-negative numbers whose sum is
1: Then there is a partition of S, (E1;:::Em) such that, for all 1  j  m
(Ej) = pj(S).
Using Claim 4 we can identify ﬁnitely-valued lotteries with vNM lotteries
over X. Speciﬁcally, given a vNM lottery L with a ﬁnite support over X, one
may use Claim 4 to construct a lottery a 2 A such that L is the distribution
on X deﬁned by a. Moreover, for all 0  i  n, all such lotteries a are
i-equivalent since they have the expected utility. Conversely, any ﬁnitely-
valued lottery a 2 A deﬁnes a distribution over X, which is a vNM lottery.
It follows that, restricting f%ig0in to lotteries in A one may apply
Harsanyi’s (1955) theorem to conclude that u0 is a linear combination of
fuign
i=1. (For a recent proof of Harsanyi’s Theorem, DeMeyer and Mongin
(1995) is recommended.)
8The restricted Pareto condition is necessary. Let a;b be lotteries.
Since 0 is an aﬃne combination of fign
i=1, 0(E) = i(E) for all i 2 N and




S ui(c)d0. For all
i 2 N, the condition a i b implies that
R
S(ui(a)  ui(b))di = 0. Hence,
for all i 2 N,
R




S(u0(a)  u0(b))d0 = 0 also follows, and a 0 b is proved.
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